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Abstract In order to fight massive vandalism the English-
language Wikipedia has developed a system of surveillance
which is carried out by humans and bots, supported by
various tools. Central to the selection of edits for inspection
is the process of using filters or profiles. Can this profiling
be justified? On the basis of a careful reading of Frederick
Schauer’s books about rules in general (1991) and profiling
in particular (2003) I arrive at several conclusions. The
effectiveness, efficiency, and risk-aversion of edit selection
all greatly increase as a result. The argument for increasing
predictability suggests making all details of profiling
manifestly public. Also, a wider distribution of the more
sophisticated anti-vandalism tools seems indicated. As to
the specific dimensions used in profiling, several critical
remarks are developed. When patrollers use ‘assisted edit-
ing’ tools, severe ‘overuse’ of several features (anonymity,
warned before) is a definite possibility, undermining profile
efficacy. The easy remedy suggested is to render all of
them invisible on the interfaces as displayed to patrollers.
Finally, concerning not only assisted editing tools but tools
against vandalism generally, it is argued that the anonymity
feature is a sensitive category: anons have been in dispute
for a long time (while being more prone to vandalism).
Targeting them as a special category violates the social
contract upon which Wikipedia is based. The feature is
therefore a candidate for mandatory ‘underuse’: it should
be banned from all anti-vandalism filters and profiling
algorithms, and no longer be visible as a special edit trait.
Keywords Algorithms  Bots  Discrimination  Profiling 
Rules  Vandalism  Wikipedia
[I]t is the very silence itself, the ability to take things off the agenda as
well as to put them on, that explains much what is valuable about rules.
(Schauer 1991: closing sentence on p. 233)
Introduction
So-called open content communities thrive on the contri-
butions from their respective crowds in order to produce
software, news, reference entries, videos, maps, and the
like. Well-known examples include Linux, Reddit, Now-
Public, Wikipedia, and YouTube. Basic parameters for
communities of the kind are twofold (cf. Dutton 2008; de
Laat 2012). On the one hand we must distinguish the type
of collaboration as enabled by their web design. It may
involve just piling up all contributed contents (‘loose col-
laboration’) or also working on a collectively evolving
product (‘tight collaboration’). Or in the terminology pro-
posed by Dutton (2008): collaboration may range from co-
contributing (2.0) to co-creation (3.0). The other basic
parameter for communities of open content is their condi-
tions of admission to the work process, which may range
from fully open access to more restricted access.
The open invitation to contribute yields variable results.
Although a large majority of contributions are usually
valuable for the goals of the project, invariably disruptive
and damaging contributions are coming in as well: they are
off-topic, inappropriate, improper, offensive, and/or mali-
cious, and so on. Obviously, the more a community leans
towards full-blown co-creation (‘open collaboration’), the
more urgent the issue becomes, since disruptive edits may
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actually endanger the integrity of the collective product as
a whole.
In response, many open collaboration projects have
taken to developing anti-intrusion systems that try to detect
improper contributions and eliminate them before they can
do any damage. Many types are in use, closely connected
to the specific communities involved. Two dimensions are
characteristic of such systems (de Laat 2015: pp. 175–176).
On the one hand we may distinguish who is involved in
them: managing editors employed by the project (who may
hire additional workers), a selected elite of users, and/or all
users without distinction. On the other hand we have to
distinguish, for the personnel involved, what they are
allowed to do about new contributions: check them, vote
on them, and/or correct them. In general, the more massive
the disruptions to a community, the more pressure builds
towards enlarging the anti-intrusion work force (by
mobilizing more ordinary users) and/or granting them more
powers (powers of correction in particular).
A prime example of an open collaboration community
plagued by damaging disruptions is Wikipedia, the co-
creative encyclopedia with full write-access for all.
Although all language versions suffer from vandalism, its
English language version does so in particular. How large
exactly is the phenomenon of vandalism in the English
Wikipedia? Against a background of over 5 million entries,
growing at a rate of 800 new ones a day, Wikipedia daily
receives 90,000 fresh edits from human contributors. About
8.5 % of those may be estimated to be instances of van-
dalism. So every day Wikipedia has to deal with as many
as 7500 malicious edits.1 In response, various approaches
have been tried out and tested; some have endured, others
have perished. My focus is on the approach that has carried
the day: a massive mobilization of Wikipedian volunteers
to monitor and survey new edits around the clock. From
administrators at the top to ordinary users at the bottom, all
are asked to do their part; moreover, fully autonomous bots
are enlisted as ‘co-workers’. These mobilization efforts are
facilitated and enhanced by the development of an array of
anti-vandalism tools.
This system of surveillance, carried out by humans, bots,
and tools, has been described before and analysed in view
of the moral questions that it raises (de Laat 2015). It was
found, to begin with, that, although all Wikipedians are
invited to watch out for vandalism and revert any instance
of the kind, the stronger tools in the counter-vandalism
repertoire which allow faster search and correction are only
distributed to trusted users. This policy has been adopted
since the tools can do much damage. Moreover, I argued
that these stronger tools may favour quantity over quality
while checking edits and cause a loss of the required moral
skills in relation to newcomers. In general, the system was
found to operate in an invisible and opaque fashion, well
hidden from sight to ordinary users. Besides these ques-
tionable issues there was one more issue that I brought to
the fore. In order to facilitate the process of selecting edits
for inspection, effectively profiles are being constructed
and put to use. Some dimensions of those profiles appear to
be problematic (de Laat 2015: pp. 181–182, section on
‘profiling’). In the remainder of this article I analyse this
claim in a more complete fashion—two pages cannot do
justice to the complexity of the issues involved. So this
article continues the discussion about profiling initiated
earlier. Nevertheless it is intended to stand on its own;
therefore all details necessary for the discussion will be
reproduced below from the earlier publication.
The analysis proceeds as follows. The Wikipedian tools
for edit selection and edit correction are extensively
described; an important supporting element is the deploy-
ment of algorithms for calculating vandalism probabilities.
After this exposition I give an overview of what is gener-
ally meant by profiling, and develop an account of how
Wikipedia engages in profiling; a spectrum of increasing
profiling for anti-vandalism purposes is distinguished.
Subsequently I tackle the questions whether and to what
extent these profiling practices are effective and efficient, as
well as morally justified. In order to do so, I draw on two
treatises by Frederick Schauer, an American philosopher of
law.
His Playing by the Rules (1991) provides a framework
to judge the (dis)advantages of the system of profiling as a
specific system of rules. Thereafter, his Profiles,
Probabilities, and Stereotypes (2003) provides a useful
background to discuss complications resulting from the
specific choice of profile features. On the one hand,
particular dimensions may be ‘overused’ by human rule-
enforcers, thus undermining profile efficacy. On the other
hand, features may represent sensitive dimensions (such as
race and religion) that may stir up social tensions—or
create them in the first place. These general insights pro-
vide a lens to analyse and comment on the dimensions used
in Wikipedian profiling.
Wikipedia: anti-vandalism tools2
Fighting vandalism basically consists of two stages. In the
first stage (‘selection’) a new edit to the encyclopedia is
selected for inspection; in the second stage (‘inspection’)
1 All figures derived from https://stats.wikimedia.org/EN and https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Vandalism_statistics.
2 The two sections that follow—on tools and algorithms—are
abstracted from de Laat (2015). They are the necessary building
blocks to start the discussion proper about profiling.
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the edit is actually inspected. If it is found to be obviously
vandalistic it gets deleted (reversed); if it is found to be a
bona fide edit, it is left intact. In reality, of course, bor-
derline cases may turn up: the issue is not always so clear-
cut. In such cases, a patroller may choose to act on these
doubts by leaving a message on the editor’s talk page,
amending the edit involved, and the like.
Concerning the first stage of edit selection, new edits—
which come in all the time—can be displayed on the
screen in an ever-continuing list. Since inspecting all of
them is impossible in view of the numbers involved, any
patroller has to make some selection. It is precisely at this
point in the process that several tools facilitate making
this selection. First, the type of entry which has been
edited may be selected. One composes a list of specific
entries and watches only new edits to that selection of
entries (in Wikipedia a so-called ‘watch list’ can be cre-
ated for the purpose). Similarly, entries about living
people can be watched closely. Secondly, one may focus
on features of content: edits containing bad words, with
massive blanking, either in part or as a whole, etc.
Thirdly, editor characteristics may be focussed on: con-
tributors who are anonymous (i.e., they have not regis-
tered, have no personal account), are new, have been
warned, have been blacklisted before, etc. In the opposite
vein one may choose to ignore edits made by certain
types of contributors: administrators, bots, whitelisted
users, and the like. Not unimportantly, to some extent
filters can be combined and applied together; an obvious
combination would be selecting anonymous contributions
containing ‘bad words’.
Subsequently, after inspecting the selected edit, the
patroller may revert it if it is diagnosed as vandalistic. Such
edit reversal can be supported by several buttons that allow
performing instantly appropriate follow-up actions: leave a
warning message on the talk page of the vandal, ask for
administrator intervention against him/her, ask for the page
to be ‘protected’ (i.e., categories of users are temporarily
excluded from contributing, typically users who have just
recently registered or not at all), and the like. Without these
buttons, actions of this kind are cumbersome to perform.
These supportive functions for selecting and inspecting
have, in various combinations, found their way into a range
of concrete tools. The main ones are displayed in Fig. 1
(copied from de Laat 2015)—several of them will be dis-
cussed more fully below. For the moment let me, for
illustrative purposes, just mention the #cvn-wp-en freenode
channel. On this channel, IRC bots continuously broadcast
fresh edits deemed suspicious. Moreover, the reason(s) for
suspicion are specified as well: possible gibberish, large
removal, blanking, etc. They obtain their colouring
according to relevant editor characteristics: purple for a
normal user, dark green for an anonymous user, red for a
blacklisted user, and so on. So a multiple focus for
selecting new edits can easily be practised.
Wikipedia: algorithms
The most recent boost to fight vandalism has come from
the development of computational approaches. Algorithms
of the kind calculate the probabilities for each edit that it is
actually vandalistic. Four varieties have been developed so
far (Adler et al. 2011). As far as content is concerned, they
may focus on language features (e.g., bad words, pronoun
frequencies), or on language-independent textual features
(e.g., use of capitals, changes to numerical content, dele-
tion of text). A third type focusses on so-called metadata
(e.g., time and place the edit was made, anonymous editor,
warned editor), while a fourth and last type focusses on the
editor’s reputation as a trustworthy contributor, and on the
text trust of the article involved (i.e., its reputation as it is
revised by trustworthy editors).3 All measures have
something to say for them—although reputation sometimes
has to be ruled out as being unreliable. Empirically, after a
computer tournament with all approaches participating, it
has been concluded that a combination of all four—if
feasible—works best.
These algorithms have been incorporated as ‘engines’ in
anti-vandalism tools. On the one hand, they figure in ‘as-
sisted editing’ tools like Huggle and STiki (Fig. 1). Let me
describe the workings of both tools. As concerns STiki, the
more sophisticated tool of the two, at its back-end new
edits pulled from the Wikipedia servers are continuously
fed to the engine. Edits are then classified by means of a
specific method of machine learning: an alternating deci-
sion tree (ADTree). The most fitting values for the tree
have been obtained before by training the model off-line on
a reliable dataset of Wikipedian edits from the past
(comprising both vandalistic and non-vandalistic edits); a
dozen edit features of the third variety (metadata) were
used in the analysis.4 As an outcome of this supervised
learning the classifier is incorporated into the STiki soft-
ware and calculates the vandalism probabilities for
incoming edits. Subsequently, suspect edits are passed
from the back-end to the front-end and offered to human
STiki operators in an ordered queue for inspection;
patrollers have to process them from the top. Edits can be
3 The difference between metadata and reputational measures—both
at the metalevel beyond the edit itself—is just a matter of definition:
metadata can be obtained immediately from edits as they appear on
the Wikipedia server, while reputation is the outcome of—often
complex—calculations that require data from the past.
4 Currently, the outcomes of the neural network approach as
employed by ClueBotNG (see below) can also be chosen as an
alternative engine.
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accepted (classified as either innocent or pass; the latter
option signals that the patroller is not quite sure) or
reverted (either as vandalism, or as good-faith edit if no
malicious intent seems to be present). Moreover, by means
of several buttons comments and/or warnings can be
instantly posted on the editor’s talk page.
Huggle works in a similar fashion: incoming fresh edits
are assigned a vandalism probability, based on simple
manual scoring rules (in particular on the number of ‘bad
words’). The number of features taken into account is also
a few dozen. These edits are subsequently offered to
patrollers for selection in an ordered queue, with the higher
probabilities on top. Unlike STiki, though, edits are shown
with various colours which indicate suspicious features
(such as editor has been warned, reported, or blocked).
Patrollers may then be guided by these colours in their
selection of edits from the queue for inspection—they are
free to choose among them. Subsequent actions after edit
inspection—acceptance, or reversion and posting a warn-
ing—proceed in a similar way again as in STiki.
On the other hand, these algorithms serve as engines for
several fully autonomous bots (Fig. 1). These operate rather
like the assisted editing tools just described, except that the
operator in charge is not made of flesh and bones but of
silicon. The decision to revert is made on the basis of
vandalism probabilities; the ones above a certain threshold
are reverted automatically and a message to that effect is
posted on the vandal’s talk page. At first calculations were
based on manually written scoring rules (lists of bad words
were the humble beginnings). Gradually, now, machine
learning is taking over. The prime example of this
approach is ClueBotNG. A Bayesian classifier has
determined optimal vandalism weights for words and
combinations of words in edits; these scores have been
used as input for artificial neural network learning. About
300 edit features have been taken into account in the pro-
cess. The model has been trained on a dataset of good and
bad edits as classified by humans. Its output for any fresh
edit is used as the edit’s vandalism score. It is this trained
bot which manages to check all edits coming in and reverts
about one every minute. In terms of numbers, this bot is the
top patroller of all time; it has reverted millions of edits
since its inception in 2011.
Wikipedia: profiling
After this description of the whole array of counter-van-
dalism tools and bots in use, let me focus specifically on
the first stage of patrolling: selection of new edits for closer
inspection. My argument is that the forms of selection
practised, from the most basic form up to the most
Phase of ﬁghng vandalism: Selecon of edits Inspecon of edits
Operators with their tools:
Human operator using Vandal Fighter Use of ﬁlters
Human operator using #cvn wp en Use of ﬁlters (alone or
several combined)
Human operator using Lupin Use of ﬁlters Use of buons
Human operator using Twinkle Use of buons
Human operator using ‘rollback’ Use of buon
Human operator using WPCVN Use of scoring algorithms
Human operator using Huggle Use of scoring algorithms Use of buons
Human operator using STiki Use of scoring algorithms Use of buons
Autonomous bot
(ClueBotNG in parcular)
Use of scoring algorithms Autonomous acon
Fig. 1 Anti-vandalism tools in Wikipedia and their affordances
beyond the ‘basic mode’ of fighting vandalism (selection; cf. http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Cleaning_up_vandalism/Tools)
Notes: ‘Basic mode’ means that only the basic facilities of the
Wikipedian architecture are employed (no additional tools are used);
tools mentioned in the table can sometimes be usefully employed
together (e.g., Lupin and Twinkle; WPCVN and Twinkle); WPCVN
is out of order since January 2014. The tools of Vandal Fighter, #cvn-
wp-en, Lupin, Twinkle, and WPCVN are available to all Wikipedi-
ans, the stronger tools of ollback, Huggle, and STiki require special
permission.
Source: de Laat (2015)
134 P. B. de Laat
123
sophisticated form, represent ever so many stages of sam-
pling as steered by a profile. What do I mean by the term?
Originally profiling referred to constructing a bundle of
personal characteristics meant to indicate the person or
persons one is looking for. Criminal—or offender—pro-
filing is the archetype: the police are searching for a
criminal who fits a particular profile. So originally profiling
was very person-based: the data on which the profile was
based were personal data, the target was a specific indi-
vidual. Gradually, however, the term profiling has acquired
a much broader meaning, in particular regarding the target,
the data collected, and the underlying techniques.
a. Kind of target It might seem that as a rule profiling
targets specific individuals: persons who deviate from
the norm that is involved. Officials are looking for a
criminal, for persons who illegally crossed the border,
for drivers who speeded through a red light, and the
like. But often enough, a profile is not intended to
catch individuals but to catch acts of deviance.
Officials are on the lookout for instances of tax
evasion, money laundering, drugs trafficking, contra-
band smuggling, or boarding a plane with explosives.
So properly speaking not deviants are targeted but acts
of deviance.5
b. Kind of data collected As a rule, nowadays not only
data of a personal nature but any data are collected that
have a connection with the act of deviance that is the
target. In particular behavioural data and data about the
particular transaction concerned are (also) employed
for use in a profile. For the purposes of detecting
income tax evasion, money laundering, drug traffick-
ing, or smuggling, officials routinely collect indicators
of behaviour deemed suspicious (Schauer 2003; Can-
hoto and Backhouse 2008; Zarski 2011).
c. Underlying techniques Profiling has turned into a
sophisticated process of pattern recognition that uses
large databases and employs techniques such as data
matching and data mining. Its essence is discovery of
knowledge; profiles are being constructed in an
inductive fashion (Hildebrandt 2008). Anrig et al.
(2008) give an overview of the basic techniques of data
mining involved. Output for decision-making is deliv-
ered by either a black-box approach which is basically
opaque (typically neural networks); or by a structured
decision-making process that can be read and inter-
preted by humans—and explained to other humans too
(typically classifiers and decision trees) (cf. also
Canhoto and Backhouse 2008).
So taken together the conception of profiling has
acquired a more general meaning that is useful across a
range of situations. Steinbock nicely catches the connection
with the criminal profiling of old: ‘‘Data mining’s com-
puterized sifting of personal characteristics and behaviours
(sometimes called ‘pattern matching’) is a more thorough,
regular, and extensive version of criminal profiling’’
(Steinbock 2005: p. 4). In a way, economists have always
employed this broad conception of profiling when they
define it as ‘‘the prediction of outcomes of interest condi-
tional on observable covariates and the use of such pre-
dictions to make decisions regarding the members of a
population’’ (Epple et al. 2006: p. F460). Another term they
use is ‘statistical discrimination’.
If we now turn our attention to Wikipedia again, the anti-
vandalism tools described above can easily be interpreted as
ever so many instances of profiling. First observe that these
efforts are focussed on vandalistic editing, on catching
malicious edits as soon as possible after having been con-
tributed. The focus is definitely not on identifying and
catching supposed vandals—I know of just one author
pleading for such an emphasis (Kumar et al. 2015). Further,
the kind of data being used in the tools described are as broad
as possible, mainly behavioural (about the contributor:
metadata, reputational data) and transactional (about the edit
itself: language and textual features). Finally, the more
sophisticated tools rely on generating a pattern by means of
either structured decision-making (decision trees) or a black-
box approach (neural networks). So the anti-vandalism tools
exemplify the broader type of profiling.
If this profiling is done properly, Wikipedian vandalism
fighting promises to yield more hits than are obtained by
simple random sampling. Let me survey the various
approaches from this angle. The Wikipedian patrollers who
use no tools (as listed in Fig. 1) whatsoever are obviously
not involved in profiling. They may just be looking at a
screen full of new edits—and per force just take a random
sample (since speed defies their checking all of them). Or,
alternatively, they may take a special interest in specific
entries that they want to keep free from vandalism.
Accordingly they focus on fresh edits to these entries in
particular—their sampling is ‘subject-based’. Next con-
sider patrollers who employ the less sophisticated tools
from Fig. 1: tools such as the freenode channel or Vandal
Fighter guide their selection process. As explained above,
such tools allow filtering new edits along one or more
dimensions. That is, said patrollers, based on their own
personal experiences, reason—whether correctly or not—
as to which dimensions promise the best catch, and decide
to trawl accordingly. In other words, after careful reasoning
5 For ease of exposition I only mention norm deviance that is guarded
by state officials here. But of course in the private sector it has long
been standing practice to use profiles in order to assess risks when
serving customers. In this vein insurance companies estimate
insurance risks and banks assess customer creditworthiness for
lending purposes.
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they decide to construct a specific profile and subsequently
apply it to the fresh data. I henceforth denote this screening
as ‘informal’ profiling (cf. also Schauer 2003: p. 173).
Patrolling in its more sophisticated form uses data
mining approaches, be it performed by humans (assisted
editing) or by bots. An elaborate profile is constructed,
counting up to dozens of dimensions (Huggle, STiki) or
hundreds of them (ClueBotNG). The profile directs the
attention of patrollers in a forced manner: a queue of edits
with the highest scores on top is presented to them, like a
pile of cards to be dealt with. While using Huggle a human
patroller may still choose from among the queue and jump
in at any point, using STiki one no longer has a choice: one
can only proceed by pronouncing one’s verdict on the edits
in the queue (a batch of 5 edits), one after the other. One
may switch queues in STiki (from the metadata to the
ClueBotNG queue), but then it is the same story all over
again—a new batch of 5 edits waits. Bot patrollers, finally,
revert the highest probabilities on their own, leaving the
other, lower probabilities to their human counterparts.
So in all, as concerns selecting fresh edits toWikipedia for
inspection we can distinguish a spectrum of increasing pro-
filing: random or subject-based sampling (without using any
profiles), informal profiling, formal profiling, up to auto-
mated profiling. It is this profiling that takes centre stage in
this article. For one thing we ask: is this profiling profitable,
does it bring the rewards that are usually associated with it?
For another we ask: is this profiling approach towards edit
selection justified? In particular, do any of the dimensions in
use raise moral objections? If so, can these objections be met
in a satisfactory fashion, or do such controversial dimensions
have to be adapted or eliminated? It is these questions that I
attempt to answer in the body of this article below.
Schauer: reasons for rules
Frederick Schauer has become famous for two books. His
Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (2003) is a dis-
cussion of profiling in several contexts; I make use of it
later on, while discussing the issues raised by the specific
dimensions used in Wikipedian profiling. A decade earlier
he published Playing by the Rules (1991) in which he
discussed rules and rule-based decision-making in social
life. Speaking in general he asks: what good are rules for
regulating our behaviour? What can be said in their favour?
In this section I give a brief summary of this discussion
about rules. Then, in the subsequent section, I adapt his
‘reasons for rules’ in order to shed light on the rewards that
Wikipedian profiling may bring. Note—oddly enough,
from my point of view—that Schauer himself does not
bring his 1991 arguments to bear on his discussion of
profiling (as covered in Schauer 2003).
In chapter 7 of Playing by the Rules Schauer adduces
some reasons for rules. From the outset, he resolutely
pushes aside the argument from fairness: decision-making
based on rules can only be less just than deciding each case
on a particularistic basis (Schauer 1991: par. 7.1, p. 135 ff.).
Rules force unlike cases to be treated alike, and may
therefore deviate from an optimal decision that takes all
particular circumstances into account. Some of his favourite
examples are ‘Speed Limit 55’ for traffic and ‘No Dogs
Allowed’ for restaurants. As to the former case, in some
situations 75 Miles might be quite safe, while in other sit-
uations even 45 Miles is dangerous. Similarly, some dogs
are capable of very civil behaviour in a restaurant, while
other living creatures (such as snakes) may create great
havoc. As Schauer phrases it: (simple) rules unavoidably
suffer from underinclusion as well as overinclusion
(Schauer 1991: pp. 31–34). Cases are underincluded, when
they should really be included in the light of the relevant
background justification but are not; cases are overincluded
when they should be excluded in the light of this but are not.
The justification for rules therefore has to rest on other
arguments that compensate for this sacrificing of fairness.
He mentions several. To begin with, rules create reliability/
predictability for those affected by the rule: rule-followers
as well as rule-enforcers. They can plan their activities
accordingly (Schauer 1991: par. 7.2, p. 137 ff.). This
advantage only obtains if the promulgated rules are simple
and widely known. ‘Speed Limit 55’, for example, makes
life predictable for drivers, policemen, and judges alike.
Furthermore, rules promote more efficient use of
resources by rule-enforcers (Schauer 1991: par. 7.3, p. 145
ff.). They do not need to immerse themselves in the precise
details of each case, but can just apply the simple rule and
decide accordingly. Rules allow them to sit back and relax
almost completely. Obviously, their decision-making pro-
ceeds in a more efficient fashion. Concerning speeding
(over 55 Miles per hour), for example, police officers and
judges can now deal with it in an instant.
One more argument for rules is risk-aversion (Schauer
1991: par. 7.4, p. 149 ff.). Rule-enforcers who do not rely
on rules but practice particularistic decision-making that
takes all relevant factors into account, face a hard task. In
the process they may quite well produce wildly erroneous
decisions. Often, unfettered decision-makers produce a
greater number of errors than those who (have to) respect
a few simple rules. A system of law may want to avoid
such risks, and introduce some carefully worded simple
rules which curtail their discretion. The distrust experi-
enced towards some sections of rule-enforcers may
necessitate the partial revocation of the trust granted to
them.
A final argument for rules is that they create stability in
the system at hand (Schauer 1991: par. 7.5, p. 155 ff.). All
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the arguments just mentioned—reliability, efficiency, and
risk-aversion—share a common focus on stability for sta-
bility’s sake. Rules entrench the state of affairs that they
have created in the first place. As long as that state of
affairs benefits from being more or less permanent, the
achieved stability is a desirable outcome. Necessarily,
though, such stability is an impediment to change; it
entrenches the status-quo. If change is on a society’s
agenda, the stability argument turns into an argument
against having (simple) rules.
Wikipedia: substantive rules versus procedural
rules
This eloquent defence of (simple) rule systems may pro-
duce an elegant approach to the issue of benefits of pro-
filing in Wikipedia. Before proceeding, though, we should
have a clear view of the sort of rules involved in profiling.
The rules that Schauer discusses prominently in his 1991
book are rules that guide the decision-making of rule-en-
forcers towards issues such as driving too fast, taking your
dog into the restaurant, etc. These are substantive rules. In
profiling, a bundle of dimensions is taken together that
subsequently guides the decisions as to which cases are to
be inspected. The profile prescribes how to go about
selecting people for inspection: these are procedural rules.
Of course procedural rules are just the prelude to applying
substantive rules later; after, say, singling out passengers at
the airport (using a profile), their luggage gets screened
(applying the luggage regulations in force).
If we now turn to a discussion of the benefits that pro-
filing in Wikipedia may bring, it is immediately evident
that the procedural nature of profiling rules changes the
above discussion (from 1991) considerably. In particular,
Schauer’s first argument about the amount of justice pro-
duced by the introduction of rules has to be reinterpreted.
Substantive decisions are taken with justice in view. Sub-
stantive rules may restructure such decision-making; as
explained above, in order to achieve a series of clear
benefits (such as predictability, efficiency, risk-aversion,
stability), some justice is sacrificed. Sub-optimality is the
price to pay. Our procedural rules involved in profiling,
however, do not focus on justice; instead, I argue, they
focus on efficacy straight away. This needs some
explaining.
The discussion about introducing substantive rules starts
from the default state of affairs that all cases produced have
to be decided on. The comparative question is: in deciding
on the cases brought forward, are we better off introducing
(simple) rules or remaining without them and continue to
judge them one by one? With our procedural rules, the
baseline is of another nature. We start with an abundance
of potential offenders, and realize that we have no means at
our disposal to check and pass judgment on all of them; a
selection of a kind has to be made. So it is here that pro-
filing comes in. The comparative question is: in making a
selection of cases to be inspected, are we better off intro-
ducing the tools of profiling or continuing to choose
in random fashion? It is immediately clear that this
comparative question has nothing to do with justice as
such. Any one sample is not fairer than any other sample
(since they are all candidates for inspection); the one can
only be more on target than the other (i.e., bring
more offenders to light than the other). It is a matter of
effectiveness, not of justice.6
Wikipedia: benefits of profiling
If this shift in meaning is accepted, Wikipedian profiling
turns out to be amazingly effective. Some indicators are the
following. Sampling, whether at random or subject-based,
only yields the average of vandalistic editing in general:
about 8.5 % are ‘hits’. By using proxies like anonymity or
blanking as filters this rate is bound to increase. As soon as
anti-vandalism algorithms are in operation, the situation
becomes more complex since humans and bots become
intertwined. The engines analyse all fresh edits and cal-
culate the vandalism probabilities for all of them. Their
output can be conceptualized as an ordered queue, with the
highest probabilities on top. Subsequently, bots and
humans—in that order—take their samples for treatment
from this ordered pile. First the autonomous bots seize the
highest probabilities on top and revert all of them—within
a matter of minutes. The threshold level of estimated
vandalism above which bots revert automatically has been
set very high in order to avoid wrong decisions being made
by the machine—it is calculated from a rate for so-called
false positives that is deemed acceptable: 1 in 1000 reverts.
After the bots, the humans armed with assisted editing tools
are offered the chance to take their samples from the
remaining pile. By definition, they receive the lower
probabilities (below the threshold as defined) for inspec-
tion. What the bots may not and did not touch is allotted to
them.
What about the hit rates involved? The bots obtain their
batch of fresh edits (above the threshold as set) and just
revert all of them; by definition, therefore, their hit rate is
100 %. Of course this does not imply their judgment is
infallible; the lower we set the threshold, the more false
6 This shift in meaning does not imply that all is well with profiling.
As we shall see below, the pain with profiling lies elsewhere: with the
choice of specific dimensions that make up the profile. Do any of
them invite ‘overuse’ or unjustly discriminate against specific
categories of people?
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positives will be produced. As for humans, the rates they
obtain with their samples are not fixed by definition but
variable. As a follow-up on the inspection by the bot
engines, they inspect the edits in their own human way.
STiki scoreboards tell us, that their human patrollers
commonly achieve a hit level between 15 % and 25 %.
About one in four to one in six fresh edits offered for
inspection gets classified as obvious vandalism. Note that
this rate is bound to vary according to the level of van-
dalism at the time of patrolling and the amount of time
humans actually spend patrolling. The more human beings
are patrolling and the longer they work, the lower their rate
becomes—the queue gets depleted.7
After this analysis of the effectiveness of Wikipedian
profiling, we turn to the Schauerian argument of reliability/
predictability for those affected by the rule. In the context
of Wikipedia those affected by the rules of profiling are the
contributors from all over the world as well as the patrol-
lers who are constantly watching fresh edits. Profile-based
patrolling changes the rules of the game. The nagging
question of which edits are to be selected has been
answered in an unequivocal manner: no longer those from
a random—or, for that matter, a subject-based—sample but
those corresponding to the profile. No more doubts for
patrollers about where to look for vandalism; no more
doubts, also, for potential vandals about the near impossi-
bility of slipping through the net. As may be clear, the more
we move from informal to formal profiling, the firmer the
answers are, and hence the more reliability has been
established. One could even argue, drawing this argument
to its logical conclusion, that Wikipedian patrolling could
benefit the most from complete transparency; all details of
the profiling efforts should be available to the public at
large. This would solidify the image of near-perfect
patrolling for potential vandals and operate in pre-emptive
fashion. In this light it is unfortunate that the anti-vandal-
ism system in use remains opaque to ordinary users (as
argued extensively in de Laat 2015).
The next Schauerian argument in favour of rules was
that it enables rule-enforcers to use their resources in a
more efficient fashion. This argument would seem to apply
to the Wikipedian context in a straightforward sense.
Patrollers, qua rule-enforcers, no longer have to develop
their instincts about where vandalism may hide in the ever-
continuing stream of fresh edits. Profiling tools make life
easier for them. With intermediate tools like Vandal
Fighter they may select one or two dimensions and apply
them steadfastly. With assisted editing tools the whole
business of pondering on and choosing a profile has even
been taken over by the machine; patrollers just work the
queue without having to bother about anything of the kind.
Maximum efficiency in applying patrolling resources
resides there. This argument indicates that in an ideal world
each and every patroller should be able to resort to assisted
editing tools; it is there that efficiency can be gained. In
reality, though, the use of these tools is heavily regulated:
only those who can prove their allegiance to the cause of
Wikipedia may obtain permission to use them (for details,
cf. de Laat 2015: pp. 180–181).8 Out of fear of misuse and
resulting damage, efficiency gets curtailed.
A further reason for rules was risk-aversion: in order to
prevent erroneous decisions, the capricious use of discre-
tion on the part of rule-enforcers becomes curtailed. For the
Wikipedian context this argument is about patrollers run-
ning wild. They may think they are doing well in their
selection of edits for inspection, while actually they
achieve no more than a random hit score (of 8.5 %). So
their activities are largely a waste of energy. As in the
former argument, to which it is intimately linked, they
would be well advised to turn to more sophisticated pro-
filing tools—anything is better than plain intuition. Some
nudging by Wikipedian ‘authorities’ would be helpful in
this regard. But then again, as mentioned, fear of misuse of
these strong tools largely prevents this.
Finally there is the argument from stability. Does it in
any way apply to the case at hand of profiling within
Wikipedia? For profiling in general stability—in the sense
that the profiles in use are stable over time—is not always
desirable. Consider for example the targeting of passengers
at airports (for purposes of detecting drugs or explosives).
This cannot just rely on static profiling (cf. Schneier 2005,
2012, 2015: pp. 136–140). All too often, potential mis-
creants test in experimental fashion which profiles are
currently in use. Based on the results, they change ‘per-
sonnel’ in an effort to escape the controls. In such a game
of cat and mouse, effective patrolling of passengers—if at
all possible—can inherently only be dynamic.
That being said, I maintain that in the case of Wikipedia,
profiling hardly needs to be dynamic. For one thing, the
profiles in use contain many dimensions of edit content;
these target vandalism rather precisely. There are no indi-
cations that the form and repertoire of vandalism changes
7 Note that my particular definition of ‘hit rate’ implies the following.
If bots were no longer to be allowed to revert autonomously (but just
to calculate vandalism probabilities), the hit rate of humans would
increase dramatically. If, on the other hand, the community were to
decide to be more tolerant of mistakes made by a machine, the
threshold level for vandalism reversal could be set lower. Accord-
ingly, the autonomous bots would take over ever more anti-vandalism
tasks from humans. Correspondingly, the human hit rate would
decrease.
8 There is a Counter Vandalism Unit (CVU) Academy in which
potential vandal fighters may enrol and develop their capabilities
under the tutorship of experienced patrollers (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia:Counter-Vandalism_Unit/Academy). But recruits
have to work a heavy schedule to qualify.
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much; correspondingly, the part of profiling that focusses
on edit content is in no need of change. For another, pro-
files used contain metadata and reputational data (espe-
cially editor characteristics). Here, a game of cat and
mouse has more room; but I have only sporadic evidence of
vandals changing appearances in order to get through the
controls.9 So taken together this suggests that static pro-
filing will do for the fight against vandalism in Wikipedia.
Note that it is precisely this stability of the profiles in use
that enables their efficacy, predictability, efficiency, and
risk-aversion. If stability did not apply, the other arguments
would become largely illusory.
Schauer: complications of profiling
The second book by Frederick Schauer that I want to bring
to bear is Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes of 2003.
As the title indicates, it deals more specifically with the
rules associated with profiling. Occupations treated are as
diverse as tax officials (selecting taxpayers to undergo an
audit), police officers (selecting and checking members of
the public who look somehow suspicious), and airport
officials (selecting passengers for drug screening or
screening of their luggage). All of these officials (have to)
take to profiling, whether of the more informal or the more
formal kind as we shall see. The author sets out to explain
the complications that the choice of specific dimensions for
a profile may entail. For the sake of my argument in this
article, two types of complications are important: (1) pos-
sible ‘overuse’ of dimension(s) (an issue of profile
effectiveness) and (2) social sensibilities associated with
specific dimension(s) (a social and moral issue).
Possible overuse Let me treat informal profiling first.
Several dimensions are available to the officers involved
which single out specific categories for inspection. Think
of tax officers who check specific occupations (such as
waiters, taxi-drivers, lawyers, and physicians) more closely
than others (Schauer 2003: p. 163); airport officials looking
for explosives who single out for inspection the luggage of
younger Muslim men of Middle Eastern appearance
(Schauer 2003: p. 181 ff.); airport officials looking for
drugs who preferably select African-American women for
a body search (Schauer 2003: p. 176 ff.); or police officers
who preferably halt African-Americans for routine checks
(Schauer 2003: p. 191 ff.). Obviously, the dimensions used
should make sense; that is, be causally related to the
offence involved. Then, using that filter yields more hits
than random sampling alone. Such was the case with the
first two examples just mentioned: tax officers and airport
officials looking for explosives. Their actions were based
on non-spurious correlations. However, with the other two
examples mentioned this was not the case. The correlation
between African-American origin (let alone only women of
the kind) and drug traffic or street offence turns out to be
non-existent (spurious). As a result, the efficacy of such a
profile does not, on average, go beyond the level of random
sampling. The reason why the officers involved acted so is
rather obvious: they had either unthinkingly adopted some
general stereotypes, or they were just outright racist
(Schauer 2003: p. 177).
This efficacy argument becomes even more pronounced
if profiling becomes formal. That is, a whole list of indi-
cators of those likely to be offenders has been drafted, and
in some manner guides the selection of whom is to be
inspected. The Internal Revenue Service drafts an audit
profile that creates a total score from over 50 features that
correlate with the likelihood of mistakes or fraud in income
tax returns (Schauer 2003: p. 162 ff.); customs officers
employ up to 20 dimensions in profiling drug couriers
(Schauer 2003: p. 169 ff.); and so on.10 The whole point of
these profiles is that, taken in their entirety, they square so
strongly with the deviant behaviour that is targeted, that the
officers involved in their application are well advised
to stick to them and not stray from the path. Any
improvisation that involves tweaking the profile, for
whatever reason, undermines the effectiveness of the
profile; fewer deviants are caught.
But the temptation does exist. Officers have a whole list
of indicators at their disposal. Subsequently, they may
choose to focus on some of them while they are immedi-
ately visible and therefore appear salient (Schauer 2003:
p. 187). At the airport, officials ask all Muslim men and all
men of Middle Eastern origin to step out of line to be
searched. As a corollary, the other indicators suffer and
much of the point of a profile gets lost. Schauer (2003)
dubs this phenomenon the ‘overuse’ of some of the features
of a profile.
This overuse—and attendant inefficacy of the profile—
may be grave enough to think of measures to prevent it. As
a matter of fact, as soon as socially sensitive features such
as race and gender are involved, one may prohibit the use
of such factors altogether: their use gets forbidden. The
optimal profile is stripped of the indicators in question.
Compensatory ‘underuse’—or, I would say, more
accurately non-use—gets realized. An interesting empirical
9 In particular, the proxies of time of day and day of the week,
location, and anonymity have constantly remained strong indicators
of vandalism (to be discussed below).
10 For an overview of past and present of aircraft passenger
surveillance in general and American screening programmes like
CAPPS, CAPPS II, and Secure Flight in particular, cf. Kite (2004)
and Dummer (2005). A useful annotated bibliography with a section
about passenger screening and surveillance is Tukdi (2007; slightly
updated in 2014).
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question then emerges. Does the stripped profile (non-use)
turn out to be more effective after all than the original
profile with several dimensions being overused in practice?
Does it yield efficacy ‘points’ to curtail overuse that occurs
so easily?
Usually though, there are other, more important rea-
sons—not at all connected to profile efficacy—to mandate
underuse of features: they are connected to social injustices
that may increase precisely by their incorporation in pro-
filing. This brings us to the second type of complications in
profiling as discussed by Schauer (2003).
Social injustices
Dimensions involved in profiling, whether informal or
formal, may touch upon socially controversial issues. One
only has to think of factors like race, religion, ethnicity,
nationality, or gender to realize the sensibilities involved.
Take ‘Driving while Black’, a term used sarcastically to
denote the experience of black people being harassed by
excessive traffic controls (Schauer 2003: p. 191 ff.). Apart
from the issue of efficacy, the drivers who are requested to
stop feel harassed. Any driver stopped and frisked by the
police feels harassed, but the point is that black drivers feel
more harassed than others by the experience. This is so
while they feel being discriminated against simply because
they are black. As a result, the harassing experience does
not fade away in time; instead, they feel hurt, their feelings
of resentment and distrust towards the authorities increase.
The essence of this phenomenon is rooted in the back-
ground that they already feel discriminated against; exist-
ing harms are magnified every time they are searched. This
is called the ‘expressive harm hypothesis’ (Risse and
Zeckhauser 2004).
The social tensions that such indicators may engender
can be enough reason to call for abandoning them: they
should no longer be used for targeting offenders. Other
moral arguments sometimes strengthen this call. Take the
above case of targeting black people. One may argue that a
society should not be divided along racial lines. Anything
that may prevent these lines from solidifying is to be done.
Associated with this one may argue that even if Afro-
American origin correlates with a higher rate of traffic
offenses, such behaviour is also an outcome of age-long
discrimination of black people in social life. Because of
their being treated as second-rate citizens, black people
engage in more unlawful behaviour such as speeding. A
society should not only be wary of continuing this injus-
tice—it should also compensate for the past effects of
discrimination (Schauer 2003: p. 153).
Arguments of precisely this kind—in several
combinations—have led to injunctions against using
specific dimensions in profiling endeavours. Already since
1997, at least in the USA, while considered to be of a
‘constitutionally suspect nature’, the factors of race, reli-
gion, ethnicity, nationality, and gender have expressly been
excluded from profiling—whether manual or automated—
for purposes of luggage control at airports (recommended
by a commission chaired by Al Gore).11 In other contexts
as well, mounting jurisprudence indicates that factors such
as race and gender cannot be considered suitable indicators
for profiling.
So note what is happening here: dimensions which are
experienced as social sensibilities are expressly excluded
from constructing profiles, irrespective of the fact whether
they belong there or not for reasons of efficacy. Even if some
dimension would score high after extensive and lengthy
calculations on the data at hand and should by the very
principles of profiling be included, this opportunity to gain
efficacy is forfeited. Empirically, the comparative question
becomes:what is lost in efficacy, is it a priceworth paying for
avoiding expressive harm and social discrimination?
After this survey of some of the complications associ-
ated with profiling in general we return to Wikipedia. The
Schauerian questions to be pursued are (1) whether overuse
of features involved in profiling is likely, and (2) whether
some features happen to be sensitive issues in the online
encyclopedic community. Figure 2 depicts these questions,
and foreshadows the logic of the answers to be developed
in subsequent sections.
Wikipedia: likely overuse?
A whole array of dimensions is available with which new
edits can be filtered for inspection, either more informally
or more formally (by means of a full profile). What about
the issue of their efficacy? Important dimensions used are
features of language and text (see above). Does the edit
contain bad words, a string of exclamation marks, capitals
only, or have chunks of text been deleted? Such features
most likely correlate with vandalism. I had better put this
more precisely: they do not indicate vandalism; they—al-
most invariably—constitute vandalism. They do not indi-
cate where to look for vandalism; quite often they are the
very thing itself.12 So their contribution to an effective
search is out of the question.
11 ‘‘No profile should contain or be based on material of a
constitutionally suspect nature—e.g., race, religion, national origin
of U.S. citizens. The Commission recommends that the elements of a
profiling system be developed (…) to ensure that selection is not
impermissibly based on national origin, racial, ethnic, religious or
gender characteristics’’ (White House Commission 1997: par. 3.19).
12 Unless, of course, the edit involved requires the use of such
features. Just consider the task of contributing to an entry about say
pornography.
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Next consider so-called meta-data. These are obviously
(potential) indicators—not the thing itself. Does the editor
have a newly created account, has he/she been warned or
reported before, is he/she on a blacklist? It stands to reason
that on average, correlations do occur; their use would
seem to contribute potentially to efficacy. The same goes
for being anonymous: unregistered users have consistently
been found to behave in more vandalistic fashion.13 Fur-
thermore, measures of reputation may be helpful—the
higher a user’s reputation, the less likely that he/she is a
vandal. Some less obvious features of edits are used as
well: the time of day and day of the week they were made,
and the country from which they originated. This has to do
with the fact that vandalism is more prevalent at lunchtime
on weekdays; employees and school pupils apparently try
to chase boredom. Finally, edits from countries like the
USA, Canada, and Australia are much more likely to be
vandalistic than from elsewhere. So their use as warning
signals also heightens efficacy.
Now we have a full overview of the dimensions
involved, we may turn to the first important question—as
inspired by Schauer—about profiling dimensions: what
about potential overuse of any of them? Is it possible that
patrollers turn overzealous and unintentionally spoil the
efficacy of profiling? In the case of informal profiling,
patrollers use just one or two filters simultaneously; over-
use does not seem to be an issue. At the other end of the
spectrum we have the fully autonomous bots. Is there any
danger that they indulge in overuse of the kind? The
answer is (obviously) no. Bots (like ClueBotNG) just apply
their algorithms for scoring new edits and subsequently
revert those above the threshold-as-set. This is a fully
automated procedure that cannot be tampered with by
overzealous humans of a kind; overuse as defined is simply
not an issue.
This is quite otherwise, however, for formal profiling
with tools like Huggle and STiki. For both tools I see
several possibilities for features to be overused by patrol-
lers, thereby spoiling the optimum efficacy achievable by
the profile embedded in those tools. In order to facilitate
the exposition, I list the essential features of these tools in
Figs. 3 and 4.
First consider Huggle (Fig. 3). It focusses patrollers’
efforts in two ways: a profiling system that takes several—
but by no means all—relevant features into account, and a
colouring system that displays edits deemed suspect (as
calculated by the profile) with a coloured square in front of
them that indicates features such as editor is anonymous,
has been warned (levels 1–4), reported, blocked, and the
like. Notice, by the way, that in case several colours apply,
only one takes dominance (colours do not mix). As can be
seen from Fig. 3, edit characteristics relevant for anti-
vandalism purposes have not been consistently parsed out
between the one system and the other; some features are
used in both. And that is where the problem of overuse
starts to take shape. In order to explain this, let us first
consider the—hypothetical but in my view ideal—situation
that features have indeed been fully separated between the
two systems. Patrollers obtain a queue (as ordered by the
profile in use), and apply the features from the colouring
system to subsequently filter from the queue and (hope-
fully) achieve even more hits than by just following the
queue order. Since they employ other features than those
incorporated in the profile, there is no issue of ‘distorting’
it. Applying skilful judgment they can only do better.
But in actual fact, relevant dimensions do overlap
between the two systems (of profiling and of colouring). As
a result, those dimensions are potentially used twice: a first
time in the profile, a second time, possibly, by the patrol-
lers using them as preferences for their filtering. If that
happens, the dimension gets ‘overused’ and the profile’s
efficiency is affected. As can be seen from Fig. 3, the
colouring system invites ‘overselection’ of two dimensions
in particular: editor is anonymous (in grey), and editor has























Fig. 2 Questions and actions pursued for dimensions used in
Wikipedian profiling (based on Schauer 2003)
13 Some numbers about vandalism are the following. About 8.5 % of
fresh edits constitute vandalism (7,500 a day). Most of such
vandalistic edits concern ‘obvious vandalism’ or blanking. Almost
all of them (!) have been contributed by anonymous editors (97 %).
As a corollary, anons are estimated to be much more vandalism-prone
than registered editors (by a large factor; as large as 20?!). Some
30 % of them have vandalized Wikipedian pages at least once. The
figures just given are not very accurate—and rather variable at that.
Nevertheless, the image of vandalism that emerges from them should
by and large be correct.
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Patrollers may be tempted to focus specifically on selecting
such contributions from the queue—thereby overriding the
queue order which is the result of a scoring algorithm that
has already taken these features into account. This obser-
vation applies especially to the latter feature: colours
indicating warning levels (four in all) abound all over the
queue and constantly attract the attention of patrollers.14 In
addition, in the phase of edit inspection, patrollers may be
tempted to give selected anonymous edits extra scrutiny
and less benefit of the doubt precisely while they are visible
as being anonymous (cf. Figure 3). For such edits
vandalism inspection is more severe. ‘Overinspection’
joins overselection, which further jeopardizes profile
efficiency.
As concerns STiki (Fig. 4), the possibilities for overuse
appear to be more restricted—since the tool avoids the
colouring system of Huggle that I just branded an invitation
to overuse. Suspect edits are offered in a queue the patroller
cannot escape from; they have to be judged one after the
other. Options for filtering along personal preferences have
simply been eliminated, thereby ruling out any potential
overuse of features. But what about possible overuse in the
subsequent phase of edit inspection? Most of the metadata
and reputational indicators in Fig. 4 are not (or hardly) vis-
ible from the STiki interface, so any overuse seems to be
ruled out. One of them is, however. Patrollers can actually
observe whether an edit is made anonymously or not—and
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Fig. 3 Huggle: edit features that contribute to scoring edits for
vandalism probability which determines queue order; those that are
displayed in the queue in distinct colours indicating suspicion; and
those that are visible in the interface for edit inspection
*As a matter of definition, metadata are immediately available,
reputation measures require additional computation from past data.
Notice that in the current configuration of Huggle the colouring of the
metadata ‘editor reported’ and ‘editor blocked’ does not seem to be
activated
**As far as metadata and reputation are concerned—language and







14 Note that the features of being a whitelisted user, being a bot, and
‘user page is involved’ also figure in both systems (Fig. 3). A special
focus by patrollers in this case—of ignoring them—is not very likely
though, since edits of the kind (almost) never show up in the queue in
the first place—profiling has already effectively suppressed them
before.
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anonymity is a well-known alarm bell for potential vandal-
ism, the possibility of overinspection is a realistic one.
It can be concluded that formal profiling may give rise
to overuse of several features, in particular of editors being
anonymous and/or being recently warned on their talk
page—as summarized in Fig. 5 for the Huggle and STiki
tools. What can be done to prevent this overuse from
occurring at all? For one thing, one could eliminate the
actual possibilities that enable overuse as offered by the
interface design of the tools involved. With Huggle, the
colouring system is just an invitation to overuse as far as
features are incorporated that chances are will be used a
second time. Why not sanitize that system by excluding all
features from it that have already figured in the preceding
process of profiling? In particular, why not omit coloured
squares indicating editor status and warning levels?15 Or
better still, why not optimize the profiling process by
including all features that are deemed relevant and dispense
with the colouring system altogether? Instead of a halfway
solution with both profiling and filtering, a system of full
profiling gets installed. In addition to the above suggestions
Huggle is to offer edits for actual inspection without
revealing any details about editor status: only the contents
themselves (comments included) are to be made available
for inspection. As far as STiki is concerned, it does not
suffer from two interfering logics for the selection of edits.
Therefore the only recommendation to their developers is
that they refrain from displaying editor status (registered
account or not) on the patroller’s interface.
This possible remedy against overuse, of eliminating the
visibilities in question, is depicted graphically in Fig. 2
(left-hand side). Notice that in his exposition Schauer did
not mention this option of disabling the visibilities that may
invite overuse. Although similar options are imaginable
for, say, screening at airports, the officials involved
STiki
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Fig. 4 STiki: edit features that contribute to scoring edits for
vandalism probability (with the metadata approach) which determines
queue order; and those that are visible in the interface for edit
inspection
*As a matter of definition, metadata are immediately available,
reputation measures require additional computation from past data.
Notice that I consider revision comments to be part and parcel of an
edit as a whole since they usually adduce reasons for an edit (they are
not to be interpreted as being at the meta level). Note also that the
dimensions of ‘user reputation’ and ‘local day of the week’ no longer
figure in the most recent version (as of July 2013) of the classifying
ADTree
**As far as metadata and reputation are concerned—language and













STiki N/A Editor anonymous
Fig. 5 Huggle and STiki: metadata and reputation features that can
possibly be overused by patrollers in the phases of edit selection and
edit inspection (derived from Figs. 3 and 4 above)
15 Notice that Huggle also employs a colour to indicate that the
outcome of algorithmic scoring is high (Fig. 3). However, obtaining a
high score automatically leads to ending up high in the queue; adding
a colour to it will hardly change its status of urgency. Therefore
overselection does not appear to be an issue here. Nevertheless, the
signalling is superfluous and may just as well be omitted.
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apparently insist on continuing their face-to-face screening
of passengers standing in line.
Observe finally, that the remedy usually applied against
overuse is mandatory underuse: eliminate the features from
the profiling efforts (incorporated in Fig. 2 as the measure
of ‘last resort’). In our case: eliminate anonymity and
warning levels from the algorithms that calculate vandal-
ism probabilities. This would be a drastic measure since it
ties the hands of the profilers and potentially cripples the
profiling effort. Given that—as just argued—overuse can
effectively be undercut by redesigning the options to act in
that fashion while leaving profiling intact, for the moment
this drastic measure does not seem to be necessary. Further
below, though, I shall argue that one of these dimensions,
anonymity, is controversial from a societal point of view;
the only remedy for such sensitivities is precisely their
elimination from the algorithms in use.
Wikipedia: controversial categories?
Let us return to the full spectrum of dimensions being used in
Wikipedian profiling, whether it is done more informally
(filters), more formally (assisted editing tools), or automat-
ically (bots). Are any of them associated with societal sen-
sitivities of a kind, sensitivities that one may not want to
touch by expressly forbidding their use in profiling? Are
there any dimensions comparable to race, religion, and
gender, features that stir up so many emotions in the societal
debate? Actually, many features in use look harmless
enough. Whether editors are new, warned and/or reported,
recently reverted, or have a low reputation—all of these
constitute ever so reasonable warning signs to which no one
can reasonably object. Not any kind of discrimination,
whether already existing or newly created, seems to be
involved.
Nevertheless, a few dimensions remain that merit closer
attention. Worries might spring from targeting employees
and schoolkids in their lunchtime (as part of the STiki tool).
Is it justifiable to treat them as a special group that needs to
be approached with suspicion? None of the arguments used
to ban factors like race or religion seem to apply here. The
group can hardly be called a proper group: it is just a
snapshot in time, its ‘members’ do not even recognize each
other as a ‘group’. Correspondingly, no lines of social
discrimination are created let alone solidified, no harm
from the past becomes magnified or needs to be compen-
sated. Therefore I see no reasons to argue for banning this
‘lunchtime dimension’ from STiki-profiling.
Another worry is constituted by targeting the few
countries that are considerably more vandalism-prone than
others (as part of the STiki tool again). Can it be justified to
approach contributors from the USA, Canada, and
Australia with suspicion? Aren’t we in danger of stirring up
nationalistic tensions? After all, the nationals involved
have considerable more ‘groupness’ than in the foregoing
observation. Let me first point out that no nationalistic lines
of division seem to be present in the Wikipedian commu-
nity; therefore no such lines can be hardened, no nation-
alistic past is in danger of being magnified, let alone in
need of compensation. The only argument could be that
dividing lines of the kind tend to be created by such pro-
filing-by-country in the first place; nationalistic contro-
versies might be ignited by it. This constitutes some kind of
argument—but I do not consider this dim possibility strong
enough to warrant banning the country-dimension and
correspondingly sacrifice some profiling efficacy.16
More serious, though, is the targeting of contributors
who choose to remain anonymous. Unregistered users are
consistently targeted all along the profiling spectrum,
whether the patrolling uses informal or formal profiles.
With all of them, anonymity is a warning signal. I would
argue that this special attention is fraught with danger since
anons already constitute a controversial group within the
Wikipedian community.
As a matter of fact, they are much more vandalism-
prone than Wikipedians who have registered and operate
from an account (see note 13 above). This undisputed fact
has created a lot of animosity against them. Many members
argue as a result that registration should become obliga-
tory: the time of anonymity has passed. In opposition to
this it is pointed out that some contributors are just passing
by and do not care to take the trouble to register; an option
that should remain available. Moreover—and more
importantly—it is argued that, as a matter of principle, the
possibility of contributing in an anonymous fashion may be
of vital importance for those who are involved in social,
political, or ideological controversies. For them, the only
way to continue the discussion in Wikipedia without
endangering themselves may be in the guise of anonym-
ity.17 For them, registering or not is not a matter of
choice—circumstances force them to operate as an anon.
Finally, the argument goes, while they are so many, IP-
accounts taken together actually contribute a lot to the
encyclopedia (even if each individually just offers one or
two edits); it would be a pity to take the risk of losing their
contributions.
16 Anyway, as soon as the dimension of anonymity no longer features
in profiling (as I propose below), the issue would evaporate while
only anons are currently targeted by nationality.
17 Ironically, though, contributing from a registered account (after
choosing a suitable pseudonym) keeps a lot more personal data away
from outside prying eyes; on the Wikipedia servers unregistered users
appear with their IP-accounts, which reveal features like location,
time, and more.
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It is against this background that the targeting of anons
should be judged. Is the dimension of anonymity by any
chance to be eliminated from all profiling efforts used in
Wikipedia? My answer is in the affirmative. Not so much
for tangible harm done to anonymous contributors when
they are part and parcel of profiling schemes. After all,
normally they do not experience any harm when their edits
are selected and inspected as a result of anon-powered
profiling; they will not even notice that they were sur-
veilled since no digital traces remain of the patrolling. Of
course when the patrolling does catch a vandal, things are
otherwise: the perpetrator is affected and could notice as a
consequence—but then it is his/her just deserts. The only
imaginable harm is that patrollers become over focussed on
anons and indulge in what I called above ‘overinspection’
of such edits and wrongly classify them as vandalism—just
to be on the safe side; some innocent anons will be ‘mis-
treated’ as vandals. As a consequence, they might never
contribute to Wikipedia again. In addition, the patrollers
concerned might become ever more obsessed with chasing
anons, creating a vicious circle that leaves nonregistered
contributors little leeway. Nevertheless, I estimate this
harm to be small. At any rate, the harm involved would
seem to be small in comparison with the harassment of
racial profiling—let alone that an ‘expressive harm
hypothesis’ applies.
Instead, my main argument for the ban is a decidedly
moral one. From the very beginning the Wikipedian
community has operated on the basis of a ‘social contract’
that makes no distinction between anons and non-anons—
all are citizens of equal stature. Fierce discussions over the
years have clarified that the community remains firmly
committed to this principle while contributors may have
good reasons to choose the cloak of anonymity (as
explained above). Given this pledge you cannot just pro-
ceed and treat anonymous contributors with special scru-
tiny as compared to non-anonymous ones. It will not do to
proclaim that all citizens are equal, but meanwhile treat
unregistered citizens as less equal than registered ones. As
a final contract-related argument, while some anons argu-
ably misbehave and misuse the write-access granted to
them, that does not justify placing all anons in undiffer-
entiated fashion under close algorithmic surveillance.
In sum, the express profiling of anons turns the
anonymity dimension from an access condition into a
social distinction; the Wikipedian community should
refrain from institutionalizing such a line of division.
Notice that I argue, in effect, that the Wikipedian com-
munity has only two choices: either accept anons as full
citizens or not; but there is no morally defensible social
contract in between.
Therefore I argue that the anonymous-dimension should
be banned from all profiling efforts (Fig. 2). Its underuse
gets mandated, in all possible ways. First and foremost, its
use as a scoring dimension in the algorithms involved in
assisted editing should be discontinued (Huggle, STiki);
the same goes for neural network enabled learning (Clue-
BotNG in particular): the anon-condition should simply not
be specified as one the characteristics of edits. Further-
more, this condition preferably should disappear from all
interfaces involved in patrolling in general. No ‘recent IP-
edits’ button on the standard interface, no special colour for
anon-edits that allows filtering in #cvn-wp-en or Vandal
Fighter, no grey indicator for them in the Huggle queue, no
rendering of anonymity in the edit inspection interfaces of
either Huggle or STiki—the anonymity condition should
be made to disappear, effectively enabling all patrollers to
wear the veil of ignorance in this regard. The (small) price
to pay for social stability within the Wikipedian commu-
nity is a slight decrease in profiling efficacy.18 Notice,
finally, that arguably (as advocated elsewhere: de Laat
2015) Wikipedia should make itself more accountable to
the outside world. As part of this, total transparency of
surveillance efforts is indicated. Seen in this light,
underusing (banning) the anonymity dimension is of even
greater importance. Targeting IP-accounts in the shadows
is hardly tolerable already; targeting them in the limelight
would broadcast the wrong signal completely.
Conclusions
The foregoing Schauerian exercise in justification of
profiling as used in Wikipedia for the selection of fresh
edits for inspection has yielded the following conclu-
sions and suggestions. On the whole, the use of profiling
tools has been found to be a blessing. Especially as
profiling develops from more informal (filtering tools) to
more formal (assisted editing tools) to autonomous bots
in operation, the following benefits are realized. The
effectiveness of the selection increases dramatically;
patrollers may use their time and energy in more efficient
fashion since the tools involved facilitate or take over the
construction of profiles from them; assisted editing tools
in particular contribute to curtailing the discretion of
potentially erratic patrollers and channel them toward
using preformatted profiles (risk-aversion); the stability
of profiling rules—which seems appropriate to Wikipe-
dian vandalism dynamics—serves as the foundation for
the foregoing benefits.
18 I have no hard data to accurately estimate this loss in efficacy.
Nevertheless, since the number of indicators used is actually quite
large (for the STiki metadata queue more than 10, for the ClueBotNG
queue about 300), it is reasonable to estimate that the loss is small.
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Some suggestions for change can also be derived from
Schauer’s reasoning about rules. Profiles introduce pre-
dictability as to which edits will be selected for inspection.
This strongly suggests publishing all details of profiles in
use, in an effort to create the image of near-perfect van-
dalism detection. As a result, potential vandals might be
convinced on beforehand that their games can only back-
fire—and go elsewhere. Moreover, all benefits just men-
tioned become increasingly realized the more formal
profiling becomes; assisted editing tools are simply
superior to the other ones. This suggests strongly that these
tools are distributed as widely as possible. As yet, however,
fear of misuse by malicious patrollers has prevented this.
Less than a thousand Wikipedians—who qualified as
trustworthy—effectively have access to them.
A more detailed examination of the dimensions used in
profiling yielded more severe points of criticism. They are
related to the issues of overuse of specific features by
human profilers and to the social sensibilities that are
associated with some of them, necessitating their manda-
tory ‘underuse’. Figure 2 depicts the questions that have
been pursued.
While overuse is not an issue concerning either informal
profiling or bot-operated profiling, it does turn out to be an
issue concerning assisted editing tools. Huggle, in
particular, invites overuse of the dimensions of anonymity
and being warned before. Patrollers may disproportionally
focus on selecting such edits (special colours alerting them
to the feature); moreover, they may—unconsciously or
not—subsequently proceed to inspect anonymous ones
with heightened scrutiny. With STiki, overuse is also
likely, though to a lesser extent: anons may get a more
severe check because their edits are visible as such. Such
overuses only serve to disturb the fine-tuned efficacy of the
underlying algorithms.
Fortunately enough, a remedy seems readily available:
the design of the corresponding interfaces is to be adjusted.
Invisibility is the motto: anything that may invite patrollers
to stray from the optimized profile (whether a small profile
as in Huggle or a large profile as in STiki) is to be left out.
For Huggle, the colouring alert system should either be
trimmed down in order to avoid overlap or disappear
altogether—in the latter case any and all relevant infor-
mation is to be incorporated in the algorithm that orders the
edit queue. Furthermore, for both Huggle and STiki, editor
status (with or without an IP-account) is to be deleted from
the interface that displays the actual edit for inspection.
Finally, do any of the features used in Wikipedian
profiling as a whole (from informal to formal to bot-op-
erated profiling) touch upon social sensibilities comparable
to the use of race and religion in profiling elsewhere?
Several features appear to be candidates for closer
inspection of the kind. Targeting Wikipedians who
contribute at lunchtime on weekdays, or targeting
Wikipedians from the USA, Canada, and Australia merit
critical attention—but appear to be rather harmless since
they hardly incite one group against another. Targeting
those who have not registered, the anons, however, is a
different issue. Anons already constitute a contested cate-
gory since, on average, they are clearly more vandalistic
than registered users. Correspondingly, many Wikipedians
insist that all contributors to Wikipedia register first and
anonymity gets ruled out. I defend the position that
Wikipedia is founded on a social contract that considers
both registered and non-registered contributors as equal
citizens. It will not do to break that contract while a small
subset misbehaves and put the category of anons as a whole
under special surveillance.
It seems imperative, therefore, to ban the anonymity
feature from all filtering and profiling efforts altogether.
The remedy has two components. For one thing, the feature
should disappear from all interfaces which display suspect
edits to patrollers (this generalizes the remedy for overuse
mentioned above, for Huggle & STiki in particular, to all
patrolling tools). For another, the anonymity dimension
should no longer figure in algorithms which calculate
vandalism probabilities. Anonymity is simply not a rele-
vant dimension any longer. Both patrollers and program-
mers producing the algorithms involved henceforth wear a
veil of ignorance as far as editor status is concerned. Its
mandated underuse—or as argued: non-use—is the price to
pay for social stability in the Wikipedian community.
Obviously, the requirement of banning the dimension of
editor status (registered or not registered) would also have
wider implications for any other vandalism detection sys-
tem to be used by Wikipedians in the future. Let me
mention two of these in particular. The ORES web service
(under development) intends to provide vandalism edit
scores on demand for any and all language versions of
Wikipedia.19 Furthermore, the so-called ‘managed wiki’
proposal essentially sorts edits (on beforehand) on the basis
of anonymity and editor reputation (Wo¨hner et al. 2015). In
my view, the software for both systems would have to be
‘sanitized’.
I argue for elimination of the sensitive feature of
anonymity. An intriguing challenge concerning this pro-
posal may be mounted from the nascent field of ‘discrim-
ination-free’ modelling (the sequel is based on Calders and
Zliobaite 2013; Kamiran and Zliobaite 2013). Their prac-
titioners argue that datasets may suffer from various
defects (like incorrect labelling, sampling bias, and/or
incomplete data); as a result training models (as used in
data mining) by means of them produces biased output. In
19 For more details, cf. https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Objective_
Revision_Evaluation_Service.
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order to correct for the bias involved, a first obvious
solution would seem to be to eliminate the sensitive
dimension (in line with my suggestion above). However,
there may be hidden correlations with that dimension in the
datasets in use, which would allow discriminatory practices
to continue (‘redlining’, ‘masking’). One could go on and
eliminate the correlated attributes as well, but every step of
elimination usually eliminates some valuable information
as well, thereby reducing the accuracy of predictions from
modelling. A second obvious solution is to train separate
models for each of the sensitive groups. However, this is
bound to end up in a reversal of the original bias (‘positive
discrimination’).
In order to find a way out of this dilemma attention has
recently turned away from eliminating the sensitive
dimension involved. Instead, the very models and their data
sets for training are being reconsidered. How to train
models in view of obtaining unbiased results (cf. Kamiran
and Zliobaite 2013; Kamiran et al. 2013, Hajian and
Domingo-Ferrer 2013)? In the pre-processing stage one
may change the set of training data involved: locally
‘massaging’ the data in such a way that borderline cases are
relabelled, and/or local ‘preferential sampling’ that deletes
and/or duplicates training instances are options under
consideration. In the processing stage one may take to
developing models under non-discrimination constraints.
In the post-processing phase, finally, one may try and
suitably alter the classification rules obtained.
Some of these arguments may well apply to Wikipedia.
The data sets of vetted edits used for the training of anti-
vandalism tools may suffer from oversampling of anonymous
edits (while patrollers may indulge in overselection) and
carry incorrect vandalism labels (while patrollers may lean
towards overinspection). As a result the classifiers and neural
networks presently being used produce vandalism scores with
a bias against anons. Just eliminating that dimension as I
suggested above might conceivably not solve the problem of
bias while running up against hidden correlations and/or
deleting valuable information. Should the attention shift
instead to modelling under anti-discriminatory constraints? A
serious complication is that although part of the correlation
between anonymity and vandalism is the result of bias against
anons, part of it is real. One has to separate the two effects
and choose one’s constraints accordingly, before one can
even begin the discrimination-free modelling. This complex
question appears to open up a wholly new line of further
inquiry.
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